Transnational private regulatory bodies (TPRs) composed of either private actors or a hybrid of public and private actors are increasingly replacing direct governmental regulation or have begun to regulate areas that have never been subject to governmental oversight. Such privately-ordered, informal arrangements typically facilitate coordination without entailing long-term commitments, rigid rules that might constrain state executives, or more than minimal public scrutiny. By increasing the information asymmetries among the various (domestic and global) stakeholders, and by evading or rendering obsolete traditional constitutional checks and balances and other oversight mechanisms, TPR threatens to exacerbate the already existing regulatory oversight deficit that globalization is widely believed to have created in many democratic states. In this essay we discusses the prospect that national courts (NCs) will take it upon themselves to directly or indirectly review these TPRs and address some of the challenges that the TPRs potentially raise with respect to economic efficiency, democracy, and equality. We describe some of the tools that NCs they have developed over the years in response to privatized regulation at the domestic level and examine the constraints that NCs face in applying similar such tools to TPRs, and assess the potential and limits of NC regulation.
I. Introduction
In recent years, the growing reliance on private actors in the domestic sphere 1 * Anny and Paul Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law. This author would like to thank the Israel Science Foundation for a grant on which part of this research was based.
to perform functions and deliver services traditionally provided by governmental actors has migrated to the international sphere. Transnational private regulation (TPR) bodies composed of either private actors or a hybrid of public and private actors have increasingly either replaced direct governmental regulation or have begun regulating ** Professor of Politics, New York University. The authors acknowledge with thanks the able research assistance of Yoav Meer and Reut Tondovsky. 1 On the privatization in the domestic sphere and its public law implications see e.g. Gillian E. Metzger areas that have never been subject to governmental oversight. Such private initiatives result from full or partial delegation of authority by governments to private actors, or from new private initiatives that are approved, tolerated, or left unnoticed by overburdened governments. These TPR bodies either regulate their own behavior by deciding, for example, which food safety measures they will adopt for their own purchases of agricultural products, 2 or regulate others' activities, by accumulating, processing or disseminating information for the consumption of third parties.
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The sources of power and authority of private actors vary. At times, the large market share that these private regulators possess is itself sufficient to generate the compliance of those who transact with them. At other times, as in the case of professional associations, they are backed by statutory delegation of authority from the state to control entry to the profession, and regulate the conduct of the professionals.
With or without delegation of public authority from the state, such privately set policies often shape the choices of third parties as much or sometimes even more, than official others express concerns about the efficacy and legitimacy of governance by bodies that are subject to little oversight and 3 For a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon of TPR and its implications see Fabrizio Cafaggi, New can potentially advance narrow private interests through the creation of standards tailored to their own needs rather than those of the effected publics.
Not surprisingly transnational private regulation poses even more dramatic challenges than domestic private regulation. 5 Globalization and the increased international regulatory coordination that it has fostered accelerated the long standing shift in the political balance of power in most democratic states from the legislative to the executive branch and, in addition, have advantaged those private actors with mobile economic resources. 13 http://www.itfglobal.org/itf-americas/fpc.cfm 14 The ITF's so called "Athens Policy" requires that vessels engaged in international ferry service provide employment standards equivalent to one or the other of the countries they service. This policy was invoked when the Finnish ferry Viking Line wished to reflag under Estonian flag in order more effectively compete with Estonian-based ferries in the Baltic ferry trade, an incident that will be discussed further below. Lillie, supra note 12 at 58.
as opposed to public law litigation. Part III assesses the constraints that NCs face when confronted with such tasks. Part IV concludes with an assessment of the potential and limits of NC regulation of TPRs.
II. NC Tools for Regulating TPRs
Despite the fact that private regulation takes part below the radar screen of public law and does not necessarily depend on prior authorization or subsequent approval by public authorities, national courts have developed legal doctrines that successfully identify and alleviate at least some of the adverse effects of domestic private regulation. These doctrines can often be used to regulate TPRs. This Part examines the tools that NCs have used in this context. Section (a) will focus on doctrines of substantive law. Section (b) will examine procedural norms and examine their impact on NC review of private regulation. The aim in this Part is not to discuss these doctrines exhaustively, but to outline their potential effect on containing the discretion of TPRs.
(a) Substantive Law (i) Public Law Doctrines
Formally or informally, many TPRs exercise public authority, either because they act under explicit or implicit state authorization or because their exercise of "public functions," however vaguely defined, impacts individual rights and interests that are protected by domestic constitutions, domestic administrative law norms, or by supranational bills of rights. readily acknowledge the indirect effect of constitutional rights on private law. The German doctrine of "Drittwirkung" is based on the judicially-supported understanding that in a coherent legal system, the constitution must be regarded as having not only vertical effects on the relations between government and governed but also horizontal effects among the governed. As a consequence, the constitution sets forth not only litigation more than in public law could be used to obtain crucial information that could assist in reviewing TPR.
Just like in the case of the evolution of public law doctrines, it is safe to assume that courts will react to the need to restrain executive branch attempts to evade the review of administrative or constitutional courts. The private identity of the reviewed bodies could even enable courts to overcome barriers that exist in public law litigation.
III. Transnational Regulation Meets Transnational NC Cooperation
The question remains as to just how useful the tools developed by NCs to review private regulation will be for regulating transnational regulation. Council modify its procedures for delisting suspected supporters of terrorism there is no reason that they would not be able to insist that private athletic associations improve the due process rights of athletes accused of using illegal drugs.
IV. The Promise and Limits of NC Review of TPRs
In recent years a growing number of NCs have signaled a willingness to cooperate with their peers. They conveyed information about their commitment to cooperate by their reasoning and decisions and the tendency to rely on the same or similar legal sources. Using web-based forums, To the extent that NCs flex their muscles and exercise effective review, TPRs will need to take into account the potential NC reactions to their policies rather than simply rely on the acquiescence (or collaboration) of national regulators. Over time, this should prompt TPRs to peremptorily adopt reforms in response to anticipated criticism by courts and to shield themselves from future judicial intervention with their policies.
Unfortunately in the context of TPR review there is more diversity in the legal doctrines available in the different jurisdictions, and reliance on general concepts such as human rights and due process
may be too open-ended to serve as a focal point. In the future, NCs will therefore have to streamline their respective private and public law doctrines if they are to succeed in promoting coordination. 38 For examples see Kingsbury (2009) Some evidence of such preemptive initiatives can be found in global sport regulation.
Intervention of some courts that expressed interest in protecting the due process rights of athletes has led a number of global sport TPRs to adopt standards that protect athletes' due process rights. 42 We are, of course, still in the early stages of NC intervention in this area and it is not clear what the future will bring. However, it can be expected that increasing reliance on TPRs will be countered by growing NC willingness to review the standards for compatibility with their domestic laws and concerns. To the extent that NCs have reason to believe that TPRs are effectively acting as proxies for national executives we can expect a similar dynamic to take place. For example, if national political branches delegate authority to special TPRs to regulate environmental standards, there is no reason for NCs to treat the standards developed by the TPRs differently than those issued by the political branches themselves.
The threat of NC intervention was probably also instrumental in motivating these TPRs to accept an expansive role for the Court of Arbitration for Sport which ensures that decisions affecting athletes comply with international principle of human rights.
The promise of NC review of TPRs and its resulting impact also depends on the distribution of factors that shape the inclination of NCs to review TPRs. These factors will include the types of regulatory activities to be addressed and their impact on the economic, social, political and cultural condition of the forum state. There is some evidence that suggests that courts in India, for example, protect upper middle class interests such as clean environment but pay less attention to the interests of the poor farmers in the countryside or of dwellers of informal settlements. scrutiny of TPRs will burden certain economic actors to the extent that they might boycott the forum state, we can expect significant internal pressure on the NC to avoid such review. TPRs that address the social and environmental impact of commercial activities in ways that benefit northern interests over southern ones will probably be treated differently in northern courts than in southern ones (if the latter ever get to adjudicate them). The more judicial intervention is likely to create adverse economic, social or environmental ramifications in the forum, the more NC intervention would require coordination with similarly situated NCs so that NCs make sure their forum does not suffer the adverse consequences of their activist court.
The parochial biases of NCs and their lack of experience in engaging in coordination with each other could also be mitigated by the assistance of regional and international tribunals when the latter have opportunities to respond to NC judgments.
For example, the ECJ has an important role in imposing community obligations on private parties across the EU. 44 In theory, international tribunals could also step in to ameliorate north/south imbalances and thereby limit NC discretion. The WTO Appellate Body, for example, can be in a position to review the legality of national implementation of TPRs that effectively create barrier to trade.
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V. Conclusion
In contrast to NC intervention in standard setting by intergovernmental organizations, indirect NC regulation of TPRs seems less likely to offer systematic responses to the challenges that they pose, at least in the short run. Private law doctrines vary among national legal systems to a greater degree than public law doctrines, and there is paucity of relevant international treaties that NCs could use if and when they seek to coordinate their policies with other NCs. Overtime, however, this urban developers over slum dwellers and interpret narrowly laws that protect the poor). 44 Cafaggi Supra note 15 at 21-22. 45 Id., at p. 22-23. situation is likely to change as NC experience accumulates with NC cooperation in general and with addressing TPR-related cases in particular and there is broader public awareness of the challenges that they pose. An increase in the number of TPR cases is likely to lead NCs to begin citing each other and eventually to reducing the barriers to inter-court coordination by streamlining their respective doctrines on the direct or indirect applicability of public law obligations in private law.
Two other important distinctions between public and private litigation lay in the fact that the latter is less open to public participation and far more costly. NCs are likely to be or feel less informed and therefore unable to intervene. Here too we may anticipate changes introduced through developing similar class action requirements that would encourage private initiatives to sue on TPR issues. Even more than streamlining the doctrines on substantive legal obligations of TPRs, it will be important to consider reforms to comparative civil procedure law, especially the possibility of lowering the threshold of bringing class action suits.
At least initially, the more active NCs are likely to be those of northern countries and to be informed by predominantly northern stakeholders. This means that they are unlikely to receive complete information about the distributional stakes involved in connection with TPRs that have differential North/South effects and those that regulate the social and environmental impacts of commercial activities. As a result, the review processes driven by these NCs is likely to lead TPRs to become more egalitarian and democratic from the perspective of previously disregarded northern constituencies, but only rarely from those in the south. It is also not clear whether Southern NCs, if they ever choose to review TPRs, will protect the interests of average citizens or elites.
